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A B S T R A C T
Does ethnic diversity increase or reduce white threat perceptions? Meta-analyses help orient a ﬁeld and communicate ﬁndings to policymakers. We
report the results of a meta-analysis of studies measuring the relationship between ethnic context and both opposition to immigration and support
for anti-immigration parties. Our analysis attempts to be exhaustive, and is based on 171 post-1995 studies averaging 25,000 observations each, a
knowledge base of over 4 million data points. We ﬁnd a linear association between ethnic change and elevated threat. However, for diversity levels,
the relationship between ethnic context and threat is nonlinear. This takes the form of a 'wave', with higher diversity predicting threat responses at
the smallest and largest scales, whereas in units of 5000–10,000 people (such as tracts or neighbourhoods), diversity is associated with reduced
threat.
1. Introduction
How does rising ethnic diversity in the West aﬀect perceptions of threat among native-born white majorities? In the social
sciences there is now a vast and expanding body of research on how the surrounding ethnic context –whether at the local, regional or
national level-impacts upon majority perceptions and behaviour. In this paper, we argue that a meta-analysis of studies reveals that
the competing claims of threat and contact theory may be reconciled. Threat theory, in the form of anti-black prejudice and politics,
has a long scholarly pedigree (i.e. Key, 1949; Blalock, 1967). This has received more attention following a controversial paper
published nearly ten years ago in which Robert Putnam (2007) suggested that rising immigration and ethnic diversity –at least in the
short-term- tends to reduce social solidarity.
Drawing on ﬁndings from a large nationwide survey in the United States, Putnam argued that in more ethnically diverse census
tracts citizens tend to ‘hunker down’ –they feel threatened by ethnic change, withdraw from collective life and become less trusting of
their neighbours (also Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). The debate about the impact of ethnic context on white exit continues and
remains unresolved. Putnam's claims about the short-term negative eﬀects of diversity clash with research that appears to highlight
the positive eﬀects of intergroup contact in small-scale contexts (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Stolle et al., 2008).
The ‘exit’ route that Putnam pointed to, namely white withdrawal from community and solidarity under conditions of increased
ethnic diversity, has received meta analytic treatment (van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). But the ‘voice’ route, namely expressing
negative attitudes to immigration and casting a vote for anti-immigration populist radical right parties, has not.
While there are already helpful reviews of public attitudes toward immigration and diversity (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010;
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014), and support for the anti-immigration radical right (e.g. Rydgren, 2007), in this paper we contribute
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by conducting a formal meta-analysis, akin to those for the ﬁelds of diversity and social solidarity (van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014)
and contact theory (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006).
We argue that the ﬁeld needs to move beyond the zero-sum debate between contact and threat theory. Our metadata shows that
both theories ﬁt the data, but at diﬀerent geographic scales. Our second contribution to scholarship is therefore to pay closer
attention to the size of the context in which diversity occurs. A notable advance in the literature on exit and voice has been attention
to the way in which geographic scale moderates the diversity-threat relationship. Rather than a linear conception of the diversity-
threat nexus – in the direction of threat or contact - our results reveal how context size acts as a moderating lens. That is, the eﬀect of
diversity on threat rises and falls in a systematic wave-like fashion as we vary the size of unit under consideration. What geographers
refer to as the ‘modiﬁable areal unit problem’ (MAUP) forms the centrepiece of our analysis.
2. Contact, micro-threat and macro-threat
Threat theory (i.e. Putnam, 2007) and contact theory (i.e. Allport, 1954) set the parameters of our interpretive framework. Within
threat theory, however, we distinguish between micro- and macro-threat. A number of scholars suggest that contact eﬀects are more
likely in smaller geographies than larger units. This is because individuals in diverse locales are able to meet minorities in person,
challenging fears or misperceptions, whereas at the city or county level – especially if highly segregated - the modal white person
experiences only limited inter-ethnic contact (Kaufmann and Harris, 2015: 1566; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010: 293). Meanwhile,
political contestation increases in larger units (Ha, 2010: 30). This macro-threat argument intimates that geography moderates the
diversity-threat relationship in linear fashion: as the size of unit increases, the eﬀect of increased ethnic diversity shifts from reducing
to enhancing perceptions of threat among native whites. We surmise that there are distinct forms of threat operating at each end of
the scale.
By contrast, Dinesen and Sonderskov (2015: 553–54) point to psychological research which suggests co-ethnics tend to trust each
other more than members of out-groups. At close quarters, diversity may prompt greater unease among white residents than it may at
larger scales. Biggs and Knauss (2012) and Kawalerowicz (2015) ﬁnd, using a membership list for an anti-immigration radical right
party in Britain, that whites in relatively diverse Output Areas (average population 300) are more likely to be party members than
whites in homogeneous Output Areas. The micro-threat claim appears to run counter to both contact and macro-threat perspectives.
3. Approach
Meta analyses are important to focus research in the ﬁeld, but are also vital for reaching beyond academia. As in medicine,
individual studies may report contradictory ﬁndings, creating an impression that no consensus exists and little scientiﬁc progress has
been made. Meta-analyses help locate the centre of gravity of scholarship, establishing baseline patterns which policymakers and the
public can grasp. Our meta-analysis provides a quantitative analysis of all work we could ﬁnd on ethnic diversity and how it relates to
immigration attitudes and support for the radical right. There are extant meta-analyses covering psychological studies of contact and
prejudice in controlled or classroom settings (i.e. Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). This literature thereby falls outside our remit as we
focus on the more incidental contact that comes with geographic exposure to diversity in units of varying size, and concentrate on
immigration attitudes and populist right support.
We restrict our meta-analysis to studies published since 1995, a period that has witnessed considerable demographic change
across the Western world. By undertaking a meta-analysis of the role of ethnic context in anti-immigration mobilization, we compare
individual papers in a transparent, rigorous and replicable manner which others may build on.
Our analysis extends much further than past reviews by encompassing over 4 million data points. Articles based on particular
datasets may repeatedly uncover similar relationships but it is only by considering the full range of studies that larger patterns may
emerge. The meta-analysis reveals a macro-level relationship between geographic context size and ethnic threat that would be
diﬃcult to discern from a single dataset or wide knowledge of the literature. This is because few studies examine more than one level,
and those that do stop at two. In this paper we survey a ﬁner-grained sweep across nine geographic context sizes to ask how
modifying the areal unit aﬀects the association between ethnic diversity and measures of ethnic threat.
Our main ﬁnding is an important nonlinear relationship between the size of the ethno-contextual unit and ethnic threat which
takes a cubic polynomial form. Cubic functions, well-established in mathematics, exhibit a wave pattern with two inﬂection points.
This is distinct from the curve pattern with one inﬂection point produced by a quadratic (squared) equation, or the straight line
produced by a linear equation. Our model sees white threat responses to diversity crest at the smallest (under 1000 population) and
largest (national) geographies but in units of 5000–10,000 people, such as wards or tracts, greater diversity is associated with reduced
threat perceptions. This nonlinear relationship holds equally across the threat domains of attitudinal opposition to immigration and
minorities, electoral support for the radical right and generalized mistrust. This adjudicates between, and recasts, the currently linear
understanding of the diversity-threat relationship. We also claim that whereas diversity levels relate to anti-immigration sentiment in
a nonlinear way, ethnic change has a linear association with threat. Finally, this work seeks to focus the ﬁeld, pointing to speciﬁ-
cations which all studies should apply before highlighting areas most in need of further research. In the next section we provide an
overview of existing research. We then present the results of our meta-analysis and conclude by discussing their implications for the
study of the contextual eﬀects of diversity on native white ‘voice.’
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4. Threat, contact and diversity
There is now a vast literature on the political eﬀects of rising ethnic diversity, notably the relationship between ethnic context and
public support for anti-immigrant radical right parties (for a full list of studies that were included in our meta-analysis see Appendix
1). Overall, 79% of our sample is comprised of published articles or books and 21% are working papers or dissertations. We consider
work from the post-1995 period but there is a strong skew toward the present, with half of all studies dating from 2011 and just 3%
from 2000 or earlier. Much of the quantitative work on immigration and the populist radical right is thus of recent vintage. Had we
focused on native minorities (i.e. white-black dynamics in the United States), where there is a longer tradition of scholarship, the
average year of publication would fall considerably earlier.
Our data consists of 513 reported coeﬃcients from multivariate models published in 171 studies of how ethnic context relates to
public attitudes toward immigration or support for anti-immigration parties. Further details on our sampling strategy and inclusion
rules may be found in Appendix 1. The studies we analyse deploy variables drawn from various datasets, applying a variety of
methods to distinct sets of countries and time periods. This introduces heterogeneity which may obscure ‘universal’ relationships.
Even with a signiﬁcant general relationship between ethnic diversity and threat at the p < .05 level, there is still a 5 percent chance
any given study will fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Our work helps to surmount such problems by amassing 171 articles averaging
25,000 observations each, resulting in a knowledge base of over 4 million data points.
Our meta-model reﬂects a ‘wisdom of crowds’ philosophy in which the average of many viewpoints oﬀers a prediction nearly as
good as the best individual result. This is because knowledge in a complex system such as a market or academic discipline is
distributed rather than centralised, and thus beneﬁts from being aggregated (Surowiecki, 2004; Schmidt and Hunter, 2015). Ac-
cordingly, we harness an unprecedented quantity of accumulated social scientiﬁc insight to derive average eﬀects and emergent
properties. None of this obviates the need for further research: meta-relationships change between countries and over time while new
studies contribute fresh questions, data and methods.
Leaving aside four studies that focus on minorities' attitudes to outgroups, 39 of 171 studies, or 22.5%, examine support for the
populist radical right and the rest focus on attitudes to immigration. Tables in Appendix 3 and 4 provide summary statistics for the
data. Among the studies we uncovered, just 14% are multilevel: that is, measuring diversity in more than one geographic context (i.e.
tract and county minority share). As our work suggests, diversity has disparate eﬀects on white threat perceptions depending on
geographic scale, therefore we recommend that researchers should, wherever possible, incorporate more than one level of ethnic
context.
Current practice also falls short when it comes to case selection. Just 36% of studies restricted their samples to native-born white
respondents. While two-thirds of North American studies are restricted to native whites, this is true of just 41% of European single-
country studies and 25% of European multi-country studies. Why is this problematic? As the proportion of minorities in a contextual
unit rises, the likelihood that a respondent living in the unit is an ethnic minority increases. This dampens minority threat eﬀects
because minorities usually support immigration more than native whites. Though many studies not restricted to native whites include
terms for ethnicity and nativity in their models, this approach only works if these individual attributes are interacted with ethnic
context. Given that part of the ﬁeld's aim is to understand white responses to immigration, and minority samples are in any case often
too small to properly interrogate minority attitudes, results for native-born whites should be reported separately. Needless to say we
ﬁnd stronger eﬀects – in the direction of both threat and contact - in native-born white samples.
5. Dependent variable
As stated at the outset, a major line of inquiry in the literature has been to test for the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on threat
perceptions, with studies often producing mixed results. A useful way forward is to ask, ‘What are the characteristics of studies which
ﬁnd that more diversity predicts higher threat, and what are the features of studies that ﬁnd the opposite to be true?’ Our key
dependent variable is diversity threat, the direction and strength of the diversity-threat association, which is derived from the coef-
ﬁcient reported in each model of our 171 papers. Source coeﬃcients measure the relationship between an ethno-contextual in-
dependent variable (i.e. ‘% Latino’, ‘% immigrants’) and a threat outcome variable such as attitude to immigration on a 5-point Likert
scale or whether one supports a populist right party. Naturally one could argue that attitudes to immigration or populist right voting
are not a reﬂection of threat, but, ﬁrst, we need a common label for the set of dependent variables used in this ﬁeld. Second, many
scholars ﬁnd that threats, be they economic or identity-based, are key to explaining both phenomena (ie. Inglehart and Norris, 2017).
Moreover, immigration attitudes are the most consistent predictor of populist right support (Werts et al., 2013) and, as will become
evident, the indicators are similarly related to measures of diversity, the independent variable. The simplest formulation of the
dependent variable is a dummy for a positive diversity-threat relationship (1) vs. a negative one, i.e. diversity reduces threat (0). This
is based on the sign of the coeﬃcient (+or -) reported, regardless of statistical signiﬁcance. A positive relationship signiﬁes a threat
response to diversity while a negative association suggests a positive contact eﬀect.1
A simple positive-negative dependent variable cannot tell us why some studies ﬁnd a strongly positive/negative diversity-threat
relationship because it censors the full range of values. As a consequence, in a subsequent step we use the coeﬃcient/standard error
1 Note that we correct for question wording since questions on some surveys elicit opinion on the beneﬁts of immigration and others on its
drawbacks. So too for trust and cohesion questions. We also alter the direction of the observed relationship when context is measured as % native
whites rather than % minorities. In some cases odds ratios are reported rather than coeﬃcients: those below 1 are coded as negative relationships.
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ratio (equivalent to t-statistic or, for aggregate studies with continuous dependent variables, z-score) to derive a standardized
measure of weight of evidence, i.e. the importance of a particular variable in moderating the diversity-threat relationship.2
6. Independent variables
We code for the following variables: year of study; number of observations; whether the model contains a term for the economic
deprivation/wealth of the contextual unit; multilevel analysis (i.e. whether the study contains ethno-contextual coeﬃcients at more
than one geographic level); aggregate or individual-level data (whether the dependent variable is an individual response or a district
mean, such as the share of the vote for the populist radical right – 14 percent of our studies are ecological); dataset used; and attitude
controls - whether the model includes attitudinal parameters such as ideology, authoritarianism or partisanship which are proximal
to threat.
We also record the population size of the contextual units, recoded into 9 categories. These run from 1 for micro geographies such
as residential blocks, containing fewer than 1000 people, to 9, for country. We use categories because the number of people per unit is
not normally distributed, i.e. a small number of wards, counties or metropolitan areas are very large and many are quite small. Papers
usually do not provide the modal population for the contextual units they use thus we do our best to approximate unit size from
information in the article and external sources. These categories assume population ranges do not overlap, though we cannot rule out
the possibility that a lower ranking unit (e.g. municipality) may have a larger population than a higher level unit (e.g. department).
We also include a squared and cubed term for unit size to capture nonlinear eﬀects at the lowest and highest geographic levels. If the
relationship between diversity level and threat is a straight slope regardless of unit size, these terms will not be signiﬁcant. However,
if the relationship rises and falls as unit size increases, the coeﬃcient of these variables will be signiﬁcant and change their sign as we
modify the areal unit.
In addition, we include dummy variables for papers that use longitudinal data; measure ethnic change rather than the overall
level; contain a dependent variable referring to ‘immigration’ rather than ‘immigrants’; and ask for opinion positively (i.e. ‘do
immigrants bring beneﬁts?’) or negatively (‘do they bring costs’). We also code for studies reporting log odds, tobit or probit results as
these coeﬃcients are less easily compared to logistic or linear regression coeﬃcients so have been assigned an approximate stan-
dardized eﬀect based on statistical signiﬁcance (± 1 for not signiﬁcant, ± 2 for signiﬁcance at p < .05,± 3 for signiﬁcance at
p < .01,± 5 for signiﬁcance at p < .01). We try to avoid models containing interactions (i.e. diversity x authoritarianism or
unemployment), but in 13 percent of papers, authors did not show models without them. In these instances, we use the coeﬃcient for
the main eﬀect of diversity, but code this as part of a separate dummy for interaction sensitivity. We also record region, country,
dataset and other variables, as listed in tables in Appendices 3 and 4.
7. Threat or contact: where does the preponderance lie?
Science is biased toward reporting statistically-signiﬁcant ﬁndings (Easterbrook et al., 1991; Franco et al., 2014). In Appendix 5,
we report the results of a ‘funnel plot’, commonly used in medicine and the sciences to test for bias towards positive results, and ﬁnd
no evidence of systematic bias. Funnel plots plot eﬀect sizes against the number of observations. This is based on the notion that if
studies with positive (or negative) results are over-reported, this will show up as a skew in the base of the funnel plot where the bulk
of studies (low-N) are reported. We also begin by reporting ethno-contextual coeﬃcients from studies of opposition to immigration/
support for the radical right, irrespective of whether they are statistically signiﬁcant. Null results may be vital for providing a fuller
picture of the phenomena under investigation.
With this in mind, 60% of 513 model coeﬃcients report that diversity is positively associated with threat, 40% that it is negatively
associated with it. Does this suggest, as Putnam (2007) did, that most research ﬁnds that ethnic diversity increases perceived threat?
This is a matter of interpretation. The balance of tests leans in favour of the diversity-threat connection. However, just 158 of 513
(31%) coeﬃcients show a statistically signiﬁcant (p < .05) threat eﬀect – 33% if the criteria are relaxed to include results signiﬁcant
at the p < .1 level. This means that most models do not report a statistically signiﬁcant threat eﬀect from contextual diversity.
There are, however, important reasons to believe that threat eﬀects are larger than contact eﬀects. One of the most robust and
consistent ﬁndings in our data is that statistically-signiﬁcant relationships between diversity and threat tend to be positive rather than
negative. As noted above, almost 60% of ethno-contextual coeﬃcients report diversity threat. When we restrict our purview to the
257 ethnic context coeﬃcients which are statistically signiﬁcant predictors of threat, the balance shifts from 60-40 to 71–29 in favour
of threat enhancement over abatement. If one views null ﬁndings as noise, then Putnam's (2007) claims come closer to the mark. The
take home message is clearly diﬀerent if the reader considers that null ﬁndings refute Putnam's thesis.
The results reject a blanket version of the contact hypothesis - that is, one in which diversity at all geographic levels is expected to
produce favourable public attitudes to immigration, immigrants and minorities. Yet we also reject a universal threat argument.
Diversity is associated with reduced threat at certain geographic levels. Indeed, our main point is that both threat and contact theories
are valid in their respective geographic spaces. Consequently, our next step is to undertake a more forensic analysis of how geography
moderates the diversity-threat relationship. In the next section we show how threat and contact responses are sensitive to the size of
the areal unit in which diversity is found, but not in a straightforward way. We deliberately refrain from setting out hypotheses,
2 For the 14 odds ratio or probit studies, we assign a standardized coeﬃcient of 2 for results at the p < .05 level, 3 for p < .01 and 5 for
signiﬁcance at the p < .001 level. Insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients are assigned a zero.
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preferring to allow regularities to emerge from the data.
8. Results
Recall that the analysis takes two forms: a logistic regression on a dependent dummy variable for whether a study test's coeﬃcient
reported threat decrease (0) or increase (1); and a linear regression on a dependent variable drawn from the standardized coeﬃcient
of a study test's reported diversity-threat association (from−8.7, a strong ‘contact’ eﬀect, to +12.3, a strong threat eﬀect). All can be
interpreted as asking: which types of studies ﬁnd threat eﬀects and which report threat-reducing (likely due to contact) eﬀects?
Appendix 2 reports the results of models including a full set of variables we coded for. Many variables we expected to play a
signiﬁcant role do not. These include the type of dependent variable (immigration attitudes, support for the populist radical right);
year of study; as well as dummy variables for multilevel model and aggregate (ecological) analysis. Other parameters which failed to
explain variation in the diversity-threat relationship between studies include: whether deprivation controls were used at the con-
textual level; the presence of attitudinal predictors at the individual level; the wording of the dependent variable (i.e. immigrants
rather than immigration, positive versus negatively-worded questions); and subjective (versus objective) measures of diversity. This
is surprising as including a term for contextual deprivation (i.e. unemployment rate) might be expected to weaken the coeﬃcient for
ethnic diversity (i.e. threat eﬀects). Including attitudinal data on ideology or issue positions might also be expected to lessen the
impact of diversity eﬀects on threat compared to studies that do not include these. Outcome variables worded as opinion of ‘im-
migrants’ rather than the more impersonal ‘immigration’ also did not elicit signiﬁcantly lower threat, contrary, again, to expectations.
The total number of cases (N) similarly did not account for variation in threat/contact outcomes between studies. With 84 datasets
used, many only once, multicollinearity made it diﬃcult to assess the impact of dataset beyond those with larger numbers of
associated articles. No major dataset (ESS, BES, GSS, CID, Eurobarometer) emerged as a signiﬁcant predictor of threat or contact
ﬁndings.
Critically, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the diversity-threat relationship when threat was measured as support for anti-
immigration populist radical right parties, anti-immigration attitudes or animosity toward outgroups. This lends credence to the
arguments of those who view support for the populist radical right as being motivated principally by immigration rather than
dissatisfaction with the economy or political system.
The only signiﬁcant predictors were geographic unit size, ethnic change or longitudinal study, whether diversity and threat were
signiﬁcantly related and whether the reported coeﬃcient was a main eﬀect run alongside a cross-level interaction between ethnic
context and an individual-level variable. Larger geographic unit size, ethnic change and a statistically signiﬁcant diversity-threat
association all predict that a model will ﬁnd a positive diversity-threat association. The dummy for main eﬀects in interactions is, by
contrast, inversely correlated with threat. Main eﬀects for ethnic context may be weakened or altered by being run alongside in-
teractions, so in the next section we take care to run models with and without data from main eﬀects.
The most striking ﬁnding, clear in all models in Table A2-1 in Appendix 2, is that when a diversity coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
associated with threat, this is more often in the direction of increasing rather than reducing it. The predicted probability of a threat
result, with other variables held at their mean, rises from 0.55 to 0.70 when a diversity coeﬃcient moves from insigniﬁcance to
signiﬁcance at the p < .05 level. When run as a linear regression (on the standardized coeﬃcient of the reported diversity-threat
relationship), the size of the threat coeﬃcient increases from. just above zero when a diversity coeﬃcient is reported not signiﬁcant
to 1.31 when returned as signiﬁcant at the p < .05 level. A standardized coeﬃcient of 1.31 is approaching signiﬁcance at the p < .1
level. This reinforces our earlier observation that signiﬁcant diversity-threat relationships usually conﬁrm threat rather than contact
theory. Having said this, we shall see that the relationship is not linear: under certain conditions, greater diversity is associated with
signiﬁcantly lower white opposition to immigration or support for the populist right.
9. Size of unit
The key to our nonlinearity argument is unit size. As shown in Appendix 2, the size of the geographic unit in which contextual
diversity is measured predicts a signiﬁcant linear increase in the proportion of positive diversity-threat relations, i.e. a positive link
between diversity and threat in larger units. But what if the relationship is nonlinear? Fig. 1 summarises the share of studies reporting
a positive diversity-threat relationship for each category of contextual unit size. In Fig. 1, based on our dataset of 513 coeﬃcients
from 171 studies, a threat response is reported for 11 of 14 (79%) model coeﬃcients when diversity is located in units of less than
1000 people. Net threat falls as units increase in size to those with populations of between 1000–5000 people. At slightly larger units
of between 5000–10,000, higher levels of diversity predict lower threat perceptions 65% of the time. However, beyond units of
50,000, threat again dominates (53.8% of coeﬃcients), peaking at units of 100,000–500,000 people before gently declining in the
largest geographical unit, the country level.
The wave pattern, which algebraically takes the form of a cubic polynomial (a classic mathematical equation), becomes even
more pronounced when we restrict our analysis to studies of native-born whites reporting statistically-signiﬁcant ﬁndings. Fig. 2
presents the overall patterns in threat responses to diversity when the sample is restricted to native-born whites.
Across the 171 studies each ethno-contextual coeﬃcient in each model is treated as a separate observation. For example, a study
that presents ﬁve models, each of which tests for the eﬀect of the percentage share of immigrants in a geographic unit, would yield
ten coeﬃcients, or ten rows of data out of the 513 in our dataset. If, alternatively, the percentage share of immigrants is tested at two
geographic levels, i.e. tract and county, this would produce twenty coeﬃcients. A small number of the papers we include do this,
hence one of our articles furnishes 18 coeﬃcients out of 513. A third of studies add 9 or more records to our data. At the other end of
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the scale, half the papers contribute 4 or fewer ethnic context coeﬃcients and 30 percent just 1 or 2. Since the number of coeﬃcients
per paper ranges from 1 to 18, we cluster on article. This ensures a maximum diversity of viewpoints across the discipline, in line with
the wisdom of crowds concept. For illustrative purposes, we reproduce Figs. 1 and 2 in Appendix 6 using a frequency weight to accord
each study equal representation.
In all these representations, a cubic function (with its distinctive wave pattern) is noticeable, as shown by the dotted line, a 3rd-
order polynomial curve (of the form y = a+bx+ bx2+bx3) whose components we model shortly. In Appendix 6, Figures A6-2 to A6-
4, we illustrate how model ﬁt improves as one moves from a linear to a quadratic (squared, curve shape) to a cubic (third power,
wave shape) model. Overall, threat eﬀects predominate over contact eﬀects, but when ethnic contexts fall within the lower-middle
range (i.e. 5000–10,000 population), greater diversity is associated with reduced native white threat. For the 10,000–50,000 range,
there is just as good a chance a study with a signiﬁcant diversity coeﬃcient will report a threat-abatement eﬀect as a threat-
enhancing relationship. One interpretation is that in this range there is an absence of both threat and contact, yielding a neutral
result. The other view, however, which we incline towards, is that there is a heterogeneous eﬀect, with diversity prompting contact in
some cases and threat in others. In this manner, we believe contact theory is a plausible explanation for the decline in diversity threat
observed in the lower-middle part of the geographic distribution.
Fig. 1. Proportion of diversity coeﬃcients reporting threat response, by geographic unit size.
Fig. 2. Proportion of statistically signiﬁcant diversity coeﬃcients reporting threat response, by geographic unit size (native white respondents only).
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10. Ethnic levels or ethnic change?
We now consider what happens when a linear term for the rate of ethnic change is included in a statistical model of diversity
threat. The ﬁrst point to note is that for native-born white data, of 21 statistically-signiﬁcant ethnic context coeﬃcients measuring
ethnic changes rather than levels, fully 19 (90%) display a threat eﬀect. Even if we include insigniﬁcant studies and relax the native
white scope condition, 70% of 83 change coeﬃcients signify diversity threat. In many models where change coeﬃcients indicate
diversity threat, at least some of the coeﬃcients for minority levels are signed in the opposite direction, signifying a cross-cutting
dynamic in which higher levels of diversity produce contact while change prompts threat (Havekes, 2014; Havekes et al., 2014;
Kaufmann, 2017; Tolsma et al., 2008; Walker and Leitner, 2011). As our models will show, including a coeﬃcient for ethnic change
shifts the weight of evidence of studies in the lower middle range even more in the direction of a ‘diversity reduces threat’ inter-
pretation. Note, for instance, that in 7 of 8 signiﬁcant models in the lower-middle range – where we noted that higher levels of
diversity predict lower threat - change is associated with threat. Future scholarship should, if possible, include a coeﬃcient for both
levels and changes to address this.
A ﬁnal aspect to consider regarding levels and changes is the role of longitudinal data. Longitudinal studies in our dataset measure
the eﬀect of ethnic change on changes in threat. We noted above that 90% of 21 coeﬃcients measuring the eﬀect of ethnic changes on
levels of threat show a positive relationship. In similar fashion, longitudinal studies measuring the eﬀect of ethnic change on changes
in threat ﬁnd that 15 of 16 (94%) coeﬃcients in the native white data report threat eﬀects. Even if we expand our purview to include
non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients and relax the native white scope condition, fully 27 of 30 coeﬃcients (90%) report a threat eﬀect. Both
ethnic change and longitudinal measures tap ethnic shifts over time rather than historic levels of ethnic diversity, and this increase in
diversity is what seems most connected to opposition to immigration. For modelling purposes we combine ethnic change and
longitudinal studies into a single dummy variable. Diversity levels are of course strongly tied to changes in diversity. Yet the two are
not identical: longstanding native minorities may cluster in certain areas such as northern New Mexico while areas with little historic
immigration may receive a sudden surge of newcomers, as in Boston, England, or in Hispanic 'new destinations' in the Southeastern
United States (Frey, 2015).
Longitudinal data is also important because ﬁxed-eﬀects models ﬁlter time-invariant characteristics of geographic units. These
play an outsized role in larger units such as nations, whose unique cultural values and historical institutions may be confounded with
variables of interest such as diversity. For instance, the liberal political cultures of Canada and Sweden help explain both their levels
of ethnic diversity and their citizens' relatively liberal attitudes to immigration. A cross-sectional model of the impact of national
diversity on immigration attitudes blends the cross-cutting eﬀects of political culture and diversity threat, obscuring underlying
relationships. Ethnically diverse Sweden appears more accepting than ethnically homogeneous Japan but it is Swedish culture and
history, not its diversity, which may be driving the relationship. By contrast, a model tracing how immigration attitudes change over
time within a country as diversity increases is less subject to error. Comparing the diverse Sweden of today with its more homo-
geneous incarnation of twenty years ago is better than comparing it to homogeneous Japan (Gallego et al., 2016).
The lack of repeated measures in most large-scale surveys helps explain the relative paucity of longitudinal studies. A few
longitudinal datasets measuring voting exist and some researchers have compiled pseudo-cohort or aggregate panel data.3 Most are at
country level as aggregating individual data into national panels is much more feasible than tracking diversity and threat perceptions
over time within sub-national units. Indeed, with the exception of Lancee and Sarrasin's German micro-neighbourhood-level ﬁxed
eﬀects model (using SOEP), all longitudinal studies we could ﬁnd (29 coeﬃcients) take country as the unit of analysis (Coenders
et al., 2008; Hatton, 2014; Davis and Deole, 2015; Ziller, 2014). Regardless of unit size, when it comes to assessing the impact of
diversity on threat, it is abundantly clear that more longitudinal work is needed.
11. Modelling diversity threat
Having eliminated most candidate variables from our dataset, we regress diversity-threat on the size of geographic unit and ethnic
change. Standard errors are clustered on article. Recall the two forms of our dependent variable: a simpliﬁed version based on a
dummy for threat enhancement (1) or reduction (0); and more detailed version taking the form of a standardized coeﬃcient (−8.7 to
+12.3). Table 1 displays a logistic regression of the threat dummy variable on the main predictor variables. Model 1 shows that
geographic unit size (on a 1–9 scale) fails to reach signiﬁcance as a predictor of whether a study model will show threat enhancement
or reduction.
In Model 2, which adds a quadratic term for geographic unit size, geographic predictors remain not signiﬁcant but the signs of the
variables point in the expected (opposite) directions. In Model 3 we introduce a cubed (third power) term for geographic unit size.
This increases model ﬁt substantially. The three geographic terms are all signiﬁcant at the p < .01 level and reﬂect the pattern
shown in Figs. 1 and 2 and Appendix 6. Geographic unit size clearly moderates the diversity-threat relationship. Adding a parameter
for ethnic change (ethnic change plus longitudinal studies) in Model 4 almost doubles model ﬁt. Year ﬁxed eﬀects (model 5) have a
similar impact.
We next proceed to examine the more detailed formulation of the dependent variable which permits more of the variation in the
source coeﬃcients to be expressed. In addition, we restrict our attention in Table 2 to signiﬁcant ethno-contextual source coeﬃcients
and native-born white respondents. We repeat the strategy deployed in Table 1, and results show essentially the same pattern, albeit
3 Longitudinal studies include Britain's BHPS/UKHLS and the German SOEP.
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with improved model ﬁt. The model explains 40 percent of the variation in the direction and size of diversity-threat between studies,
around 28 percent without ﬁxed eﬀects.
We thus ﬁnd a very powerful, parsimonious model of the variables which moderate the diversity-threat relationship. It also speaks
to our recommendation that studies include a model restricted to native-born whites. At the very least models should test a full set of
cross-level interactions between ethnicity and contextual diversity using white× diversity interactions to be able to best compare
with the literature. It should also be noted that the dummy variable for main eﬀects in interactions, which is signiﬁcant in Appendix
2, is no longer signiﬁcant when we restrict the sample to native-born whites. In addition, the results in Table 2 are robust to excluding
the 17 cases (of 105) where coeﬃcients are from main eﬀects of ethnic context in the presence of cross-level interactions.
12. Theoretical underpinnings of the diversity wave
The linear relationship between ethnic change and white threat accords with perspectives from political psychology which
characterize change as a shock to people's cultural, economic or political security – especially their conservative members. Change is
thus more likely to evince a threat response than ambient levels of diversity (Newman, 2013; Stenner, 2005). We have seen that the
relationship between geographic size and diversity threat is not similarly linear but takes a cubic form, producing a characteristic
wave with two inﬂection points, as the size of the areal unit increases. How can we best explain this ‘diversity wave’ function?
Neighbourhood minority share greatly increases the likelihood that whites will have minority friends: moving from a ward that
has no ethnic diversity to one where minorities comprise a 50 percent share of the population more than doubles a White Briton's
probability of having minority friends (ONS and Home Oﬃce, 2011). We believe this increases inter-ethnic contact, which is the
proximate mechanism reducing opposition to immigration. The results of a meta-analysis of the inter-ethnic contact literature in
psychology show near-universal positive eﬀects of diversity on out-group attitudes at small scales (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Our
work helps explain why this does not contradict the perspective of writers such as Putnam (2007) who report a preponderance of
diversity-threat in larger geographies.
What is occurring in large geographies? Here our ﬁndings are consistent with evidence from those who claim that larger geo-
graphical units such as counties, states or nations are where economic and political contestation takes place. By contrast, one is
unlikely to perceive oneself as competing with a neighbour for jobs or political power (i.e. Ha, 2010: 30; Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015).
The fact that the politics that counts is not local, and mass media operates more eﬃciently at larger economies of scale, means people
pay more attention to city, state or national media than local news. In addition, larger units such as regions or nations ﬁgure more
centrally for people's sense of ontological (existential) security than locales (Skey, 2011). Nations inculcate an emotional attachment
to myths and symbols much more than locales do – to the point where people are willing to lay down their lives for the nation. People
may move neighbourhood, but emigrate much less often. While local change may be unsettling, change at the national level might be
perceived as an existential threat.
Table 1
Models of positive diversity- threat association (including insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Geographic Size .074 (.049) -.235 (.263) −3.033** (1.041) −3.152** (.747) −2.822** (.948)
Geography squared .027 (.023) .606** (.206) .636** (.208) .558** (.191)
Geography cubed -.035** (.013) -.037** (.012) -.032** (.012)
Ethnic Change .906** (.275) .911** (.275
Year Fixed Eﬀects N N N N Y
Constant -.044 (.333) .663 (.674) 4.438** (1.514) 4.427** (1.150) 2.970** (2.009)
N 513 513 513 513 513
Pseudo R2 .006 .010 .029 .051 .084
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Table 2
Models of the Degree of Diversity-Threat Association (Signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, native-born whites only).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Geographic Size .529** (.154) -.582 (.642) −5.203* (2.137) −5.754** (1.999) −7.666** (2.689)
Geography squared .103 (.057) 1.109* (.440) 1.266** (.415) 1.728** (.557)
Geography cubed -.063* (.027) -.076** (.025) -.106** (.034)
Ethnic Change 2.382** (.759) 2.448** (.907)
Year Fixed Eﬀects N N N N Y
Constant −1.654 (.896) .662 (1.589) 6.313* (2.992) 6.252** (2.798) 7.270* (3.458)
N 105 105 105 105 105
Pseudo R2 .136 .163 .202 .282 .401
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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This distinction is captured in polling data in the United Kingdom where respondents who are relaxed about local immigration
nevertheless express great concern about its eﬀect on the nation. 51 percent of British respondents say immigration is a problem
nationally but not locally while just 8 percent say the reverse. This holds almost as much for whites in diverse locales as homogeneous
ones, so is not an artefact of most whites' non-diverse residential contexts. As a comparison, the local-national concern gap over
crime, the next highest perception gap, is just two-thirds as large as for immigration (Duﬀy and Frere-Smith, 2014: 90–91). Likewise,
the share of Americans who feel that immigration is changing the nation a lot is over twice as high as those who think it is changing
their communities a lot (Cooper et al., 2016: 48).
While contact in local areas and threats to politics and identity in larger units are plausible explanations for the rising middle part
of the curve (squared unit size), the negative relationship at the ends of the geographic scale (linear and cubed unit size) challenge
conventional explanations. More research is needed at the micro-level, on geographical units of fewer than 1000 residents, and, using
a longitudinal approach, on large-scale geographies of more than 500,000. Since we completed our analysis, a paper on diversity and
social solidarity by Tolsma and van der Meer (2016) replicated Dinesen and Sonderskov's results for the Netherlands, providing
further evidence in support of micro-threat.4 One plausible albeit initial explanation, therefore, is that psychological discomfort
explains micro-threat.
Our cubic model is, moreover, robust to excluding micro-scale studies. The reason is evident in Figs. 1–2 and Appendix 6, where
the next level of geography - of 1000–5000 people - scores consistently higher in diversity threat than units of 5000–10,000 po-
pulation. Both are represented by over 40 studies (1,000,000 data points) in our sample. This again suggests that micro-threat is
operating. Note as well that it problematizes the view that selection eﬀects - the ‘white ﬂight’ of anti-immigration whites from diverse
locales but not out of diverse wider geographies – explains why diversity threat is elevated in cities and regions but not neigh-
bourhoods. All of which comports with evidence that anti-immigration and radical right-voting whites are only slightly more likely to
move toward whiter neighbourhoods than liberal whites (Kaufmann and Harris, 2015).
But what explains the ﬁnal curve in the cubic wave in the last column of Figs. 1–2? Speciﬁcally, how can we make sense of the dip
in threat beyond units of approximately 1 million people? Here the most likely explanation concerns the unobserved characteristics
which correlate with both threat and diversity in large units. Comparing diversity and immigration attitudes between Sweden and
Greece is diﬃcult because the particularity of these countries shapes both their diversity and attitudes toward immigration. This is
also the case for regional ‘nations’ such as Quebec or Flanders, whose residents are somewhat more opposed to immigration than
other Canadians or Belgians; or Scotland and Catalonia, where the reverse is true. This may be because some stateless nations are
formed on an ethno-linguistic basis while others originally coalesced around political traditions (i.e. Brubaker, 1992); or due to
regional nations adopting an opposing stance to that of the central government.
An analogous pattern obtains in other distinctive large jurisdictions (i.e. East Germany, New Mexico). We surmise that cities are
less bound by this kind of particularity because power and national identity operate above the level of the city. The best method for
addressing these unit eﬀects is to use ﬁxed eﬀects models with longitudinal data, which controls for unspeciﬁed characteristics of
units. In this vein, it is noticeable that virtually all country-level longitudinal coeﬃcients in our dataset (27 of 30) report a positive
relationship between diversity and threat, with over two-thirds (21/30) ﬁnding a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect.
To summarize: we posit three major inﬂuences on diversity threat: micro-threat, contact and macro-threat. These are represented
as linear functions in Fig. 3. The curve of micro-threat (t) drops rapidly as the size of a diverse unit increases beyond block level while
the contact line (c) declines more gradually because opportunities for whites to mix and make friends in local institutions such as
schools, shops and churches remains high as one moves from a diverse block to a diverse neighbourhood. Micro-threats (t) exceed
contact eﬀects (c) until inﬂection point a, leading to falling net threat levels in the lower-middle range of the spatial scale. As we
move beyond the neighbourhood, opportunities for contact decline while macro-threat (T) rises. Contact (c) predominates over
micro- (t) and macro- (T) threats until inﬂection point b is reached, beyond which point macro threats (T) exceed contact eﬀects (c).
Increasing media attention, inter-ethnic competition for resources and power, and perceived challenges to the symbolic boundaries of
salient identities come together to increase threat perceptions. The ﬁnal curve in the cubic polynomial takes place at the highest
geographies on the far right of the diagram, but we omit it from the diagram because we believe it occurs for methodological rather
than substantive reasons.
13. How important are ethno-contextual eﬀects?
We have established that ethnic change, and both micro- and macro-level diversity, predict a native white threat response while
neighbourhood-level diversity seems to lower threat. But what is the magnitude of the eﬀect on attitudes and voting behaviour? If
small relative to other predictors, diversity carries fewer research or policy implications. While not our principal question, we can
conduct a focused comparison of contextual diversity with two individual-level predictors, age and education, which are included in
most studies of anti-immigration sentiment and populist right voting. We sample age and education coeﬃcients across 11 papers
(corresponding to 40 diversity coeﬃcients) restricted to native white respondents. These correspond to the extreme points of the
diversity wave as graphed in Figs. 1–2. The sample of papers used in this exercise is provided in Appendix 7.
Age and education coeﬃcients are compared with mean weight of evidence scores for ethnic context in the corresponding
geographic units. The mean for ethnic change is calculated using the entire dataset and compared to education and age eﬀects across
the 11 sampled papers. Results are presented in Fig. 4.
4 There may therefore be a diﬀerence in diversity's micro eﬀects between studies of solidarity (exit) and opposition to immigration (voice).
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These show, ﬁrst of all, that education and age display standardized eﬀects that are consistently above 2 (i.e. signiﬁcant at the
p < .05 level) at all geographic levels while among the diversity predictors this is only true for ethnic change.
Education has twice the predictive power of ethnic change and between 3 and 4.25 times the power of ethnic diversity level. For
age, the diﬀerence is 1.4 times ethnic change and between 2.1 and 3.25 times more than the level of ethnic diversity. When only
considering models in which diversity coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant, the eﬀect of ethnic context at the three levels comes
close to parity with age (0.75, 1.02 and 1.03 times), and is approximately half as important (0.56, 0.61, 0.39) as education.
Age and education are the variables most consistently associated with opposition to immigration – in an inverse direction. For
contextual diversity - especially ethnic change - to approach these predictors in eﬀect size tells us its eﬀects are important. To put this
in further perspective, we can examine the median coeﬃcient for proportion immigrants on models of threat in sub-national units of
over 500,000 people. If we restrict our focus to papers ﬁnding signiﬁcant contextual eﬀects, we see that for the median result
(Markaki, 2014), a one point increase in non-western immigrant share increases the probability a native-born white person will want
non-western immigration reduced by 4.4 percent. If we include null results, the equivalent threat enhancement is an increase in
probability of around 2 percent. For ethnic change at country level, the median coeﬃcient (Hatton, 2014) shows that a one standard
deviation increase in minority share shifts respondents in the direction of threat by 4.7 percent of a standard deviation on an anti-
immigration scale. This is occurring each year. Should diversity continue to rise for two decades at a rate of 1 point per year, this
would cause a shift in the direction of threat equivalent to nearly half the diﬀerence in opinion between the least (Sweden) and most
Fig. 3. Schematic model of balance between contact and threat eﬀects at diﬀerent levels of geography.
Fig. 4. Eﬀect of diversity levels (or change) on threat, compared to age and education eﬀects on threat, for diﬀerent levels of geography.
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(Greece) anti-immigration nations in the European Social Survey.
14. Discussion
In this article, we present results from a meta-analysis of 171 articles encompassing over 500 coeﬃcients and 4 million data points
on the relationship between ethnic diversity and public attitudes toward immigration or electoral support for the populist radical
right. We ﬁnd support for both threat and contact theory, with each holding sway at a diﬀerent geographic levels.
The preponderance of studies (over 70%) reporting signiﬁcant results ﬁnd that diversity increases opposition to immigration and
electoral support for the anti-immigration populist radical right among native-born whites. However, our principal ﬁnding is that
geographic scale moderates the relationship between diversity and threat, producing a cubic polynomial curve of diversity-threat. As
the scale of geographical units increases, threat ﬁrst declines, then, beyond units of 50,000 people, again begins to rise. As units
exceed a population of around 1 million, perceptions of threat again begin to subside.
While further research is required, we posit three substantive drivers of the diversity-threat relationship that operate with varying
degrees of force depending on the scale of analysis: micro-threat, contact and macro-threat. The balance between these processes
alters as scale increases, which explains the ﬁrst three sections of the cubic wave. By contrast, the decline in threat at the highest scale
arises, we argue, from unspeciﬁed time-invariant characteristics of regions and nations. Accordingly, longitudinal work at national
level, which does not suﬀer from this bias, uncovers an overwhelmingly positive relationship between diversity and threat. The vast
majority of studies which examine ethnic change also ﬁnd that increased diversity is associated with higher white threat perceptions.
In our meta-analysis, we successfully ﬁt this model to existing meta data on the diversity-solidarity relationship. Our work suggests
there is a common underlying relationship between diversity and a range of national-level threat perceptions.
Finally, we make ﬁve recommendations for further work in the ﬁeld. First, scholars should report separate results for native-born
white samples or, at the very least, for interactions between diversity and ethnicity. Second, we urge researchers to simultaneously
test for levels of, and changes in, diversity. Third, researchers should include two or more parameters for ethnic context, preferably
one for units in the 5000–10,000 population range and one for units over 100,000. Fourth, more research is needed at the smallest
and largest scales. Finally, in large contexts, more longitudinal work with ﬁxed eﬀects models is required to further assess one of the
great questions of our time: whether rising levels of ethnic diversity will engender white backlash.
Our ﬁndings have important implications beyond academia. The literature we have meta-analyzed indicates that rising diversity –
all else being equal - increases anti-immigration sentiment and support for the populist radical right among native-born whites in the
West. It does so not only because immigrant-led diversity is growing, but because of local ethnic shifts powered by the dispersion of
minorities beyond their zones of immigrant settlement. This occurs despite powerful evidence that an established presence of local
minorities fosters inter-ethnic contact, reducing threat levels at the neighbourhood level.
Local contact is not, however, suﬃcient to shift national threat levels, perhaps because a large share of native-born white citizens
have limited opportunities to experience positive contact due to ethnic residential segregation. For instance, in England and Wales in
2011, three-quarters of wards averaged just 6 percent non-white whereas over 33 percent of non-whites lived in the 4.7 percent of
wards which are ‘majority minority.’ A policy implication is that integration initiatives such as Britain's National Citizen Service may
make a diﬀerence for majority attitudes.
Education and age are more powerful predictors of attitudes to immigration than contextual diversity, and there is a possibility
that more tolerant, better-educated cohorts will replace less tolerant ones. Yet it is far from certain that immigration opinion will
liberalize in the same manner as attitudes to women or gays. First, longitudinal work suggests that people may become more
conservative on immigration as they age (Duﬀy and Frere-Smith, 2014; Gallego et al., 2016). Second, population aging means that
more people will cherish relatively homogeneous demographic memories.
Education, too, may reﬂect self-selection or sorting eﬀects (see Janmaat and Keating, 2017), in which case rising aggregate
education levels may have scant impact on attitudes (also Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015).
The prognosis in the long run may be diﬀerent. Minorities could become better established across a wider ecological range,
increasing positive contact with whites. Integration and intermarriage may dampen the pace of cultural change. New cohorts should
grow up with higher levels of diversity, raising tolerance thresholds. While rapid immigration will probably continue to be associated
with elevated threat, integrating forces may be moving in the opposite direction. This said, our meta-analysis suggests the politics of
immigration in the West is likely to remain contentious for decades to come.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2018.07.008.
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